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1 Introduction: Plurivalence
In this paper I want to describe a technique for generating a novel kind of
logical semantics, and explore some of its consequences. Some particular
cases of this technique are already known, as I shall point out in due course.1
But as far as I know, no one has noted that there is a general and interesting
construction to be had. It would be natural to call the semantics produced by
the technique in question `many-valued'; but that name is, of course, already
taken. I shall call them, instead, `plurivalent'. In standard logical seman-
tics, formulas take exactly one of a bunch of semantic values. I shall call
such semantics `univalent'. In a plurivalent semantics, by contrast, formulas
may take one or more such values (maybe even less than one, but I set this
possibility aside till the last part of this paper). The construction I shall
describe can be applied to any univalent semantics to produce a correspond-
ing plurivalent one. In this paper I will be concerned with the application
of the technique to propositional many-valued (including two-valued) logics.
Sometimes, as we shall see, going plurivalent does not change the conse-
quence relation; sometimes, as we shall also see, it does. We will explore
these possibilities in detail with respect to one small family of many-valued
logics.
2 The Basic Construction
Let us start with a brief summary of a standard many-valued logic.2
1In particular, it is deployed in Priest (1984), (2008b), (2010), (2014). These papers
can be consulted for some of the philosophical considerations which might motivate such
a construction. The point of the present paper is simply to spell out its technical details.
2See Priest (2008a), ch. 7.
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3Let L be a propositional language. A univalent semantics for the language
is a structure M = 〈V,D, δ〉. V is a non-empty set of truth values; D is a
subset of V , the designated values. And for every n-place connective in the
language, ◦, δ◦ is the truth function for ◦; that is, it is a map from V n to
V . An interpretation is a pair 〈M,µ〉 , where M is such a structure, and µ is
an evaluation function from the propositional parameters of the language to
V . Given an interpretation, µ is extended to a map from all formulas to V
recursively: µ(◦(A1, ..., An)) = δ◦(µ(A1), ..., µ(An)). And an inference with
conclusion A and premises Σ is valid iﬀ in any interpretation in which all the
premises are designated, so is the conclusion. I will write the consequence
relation as |=Mu (The u is for univalent; and I may omit the M when this is
clear from the context.)
Given a univalent interpretation, the corresponding plurivalent interpre-
tation is the same, except that it replaces the evaluation function, µ, with a
one-many evaluation relation, B, between propositional parameters and V .
That is, every propositional parameter relates to some number of values in
V . The relation B is extended to a relation between all formulas and values
in V pointwise. That is:
• ◦(A1, ..., An) B v iﬀ ∃v1, ...vn(A1 B v1, ..., An B vn and v = δ◦(v1, ..., vn))
For the moment, we will assume that B satisﬁes the Positivity Condition
(PC): for every propositional parameter, p:
• for some v ∈ V , p B v
Every parameter relates to a positive number of values. Clearly if every
propositional parameter satisﬁes PC, every formula does.
Let us say that B designates A iﬀ for some v such that A B v, v ∈ D.
Then the consequence relation is deﬁned in the obvious way:
• Σ |=Mp A iﬀ for all B, if B designates every member of Σ, B designates
A
(The p is for plurivalent, and I may drop the M when it is clear from the
context.)3
Call the following the Uniqueness Condition:
• For every propositional parameter, p: there is exactly one v ∈ V such
that p B v.
3An interesting alternative is to deﬁne `B designates A' as: for all v such that A B v,
v ∈ D. I defer discussion of this possibility to a brief appendix to the paper.
Australasian Journal of Logic (11) 2014, Article no. 1
4As is easy to see, ifB satisﬁes the Uniqueness Condition, every formula relates
to exactly one value. And in this case, it is simply a notational variant of a
univalent interpretation. In other words, every univalent interpretation is a
plurivalent interpretation. It follows that:
(1) Σ |=Mp A⇒ Σ |=Mu A
The converse may or may not hold. If it does, we will say that the plurivalent
semantics is conservative over the univalent semantics.
3 Many-Valued Logics and Homomorphisms
In later sections we will investigate the results of applying plurivalence to
a family of many-valued logics. In order to do this, some standard results
concerning homomorphisms will be useful.4
Given two univalent semantics for the same language, N = 〈V,D, δ〉 and
N ′ = 〈V ′, D′, δ′〉, a homomorphism from N to N ′ is a map, θ, from V to V ′
such that:
• v ∈ D iﬀ θ(v) ∈ D′
and for any n-place connective, ◦:
• θ(δ◦(v1, ..., vn)) = δ′◦(θ(v1), ..., θ(vn))
Given such a homomorphism, θ, and any evaluation for N , µ, the compo-
sition map µ′ = θµ is an evaluation for N ′, and the homomorphism ensures
that for any A, µ′(A) = θµ(A). So:
(2) Σ |=N ′u A⇒ Σ |=Nu A.
For suppose that Σ 2Nu A. Then for some µ, µ(A) /∈ D but µ(B) ∈ D, for
every B ∈ Σ. Hence µ′(A) = θµ(A) /∈ D′ and µ′(B) = θµ(B) ∈ D′. That is,
Σ 2N ′u A.
Moreover, if θ is onto, then the converse also holds. For suppose that
Σ 2N ′u A. Then for some µ′, µ′(A) /∈ D′ but µ′(B) ∈ D′, for every B ∈ Σ.
By the Axiom of Choice, let θ−1 be a map from V ′ to V such that if v′ ∈ V ′,
θ−1(v′) is one of the v ∈ V such that θ(v) = v′. Since θ is onto, this is a map
from V ′ to V . Consider µ = θ−1µ′. This is an evaluation for N , and clearly
θµ = µ′. Hence, Σ 2Nu A. In other words, if there is a homomorphism from
N onto N ′:
4These can be found in Czelakowski (2001), esp. Prop 0.3.3.
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5(3) Σ |=Nu A⇔Σ |=N ′u A
Now, given any univalent semantics M = 〈V,D, δ〉, its corresponding
plurivalent semantics can itself be seen as a univalent semantics, M˙ =
〈
V˙ , D˙, δ˙
〉
.
V˙ contains the non-empty subsets of V . (Hence, if M is an n-valued logic,
M˙ is a (2n− 1)-valued logic.) v˙ ∈ D˙ iﬀ for some v ∈ D, v ∈ v˙, and the truth
functions, δ˙, are those induced by δ. That is, v ∈ δ˙◦(X1, ..., Xn) iﬀ for some
v1 ∈ X1, ..., vn ∈ Xn, v = δ◦(v1, ..., vn). If B is a plurivalent evaluation for
M , let us write B [A] for {v ∈ V : A B v}. Every plurivalent evaluation on
M corresponds to a univalent evaluation, µ˙, on M˙ , where B [p] = µ˙(p), and
vice versa. And it is easy to check by induction that for all A, B [A] = µ˙(A).
Hence:
(4) Σ |=Mp A⇔ Σ |=M˙u A
A corollary of these results gives us a suﬃcient condition for a plurivalent
semantics to be conservative. If there is a homomorphism from M˙ toM then
by (2) and (4) we have the converse of (1):
(5) Σ |=Mu A⇒ Σ |=M˙u A⇒ Σ |=Mp A
One might note that the function which maps v to {v} is a homomorphism
from M to M˙ , though not onto. That is another way of inferring (1).
4 The FDE Family
We can now investigate applying the plurivalence construction to one family
of univalent semantics. I will call this the FDE family. For this family, it is
relatively easy to give a complete solution to the question of conservativity.
In this section, we will lay out the details of the family.
All the semantics are substructures of a single 5-valued structure.5 The
language has the connectives ∧, ∨, and ¬. A ⊃ B may be deﬁned in the
usual way, as ¬A ∨ B. In the semantics, V = {t, f, b, n, e} (true only, false
only, both true and false, neither true nor false, and empty, respectively).
D = {t, b}. For the truth functions: any function gives an output e iﬀ some
input is e. For the other values: δ¬ maps t to f , vice versa, and n and b to
5Priest (2010) and (2012) call the logic this generates FDEϕ.
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6themselves. Conjunction and disjunction are the greatest lower bound and
least upper bound of the familar diamond lattice:
t
↗ ↖
b n
↖ ↗
f
The semantic structures we will be concerned with are those that contain
the values t and f , plus some number (possibly zero) of the other values.
Hence we can form a systematic taxonomy by citing those other values. I
will delete set brackets for perspicuity. Most of the logics generated by these
semantics are already known in one form or another.6
• ∅: classical logic, CL.
• e: Bochvar logic (also known as weak Kleene 3-valued logic), B3.
• n: strong Kleene 3-valued logic, K3.
• b: logic of paradox, LP .
• en: a logic not previously formulated (as far as I know).
• eb: the logic AL of Oller (1999).7
• bn: ﬁrst degree entailment, FDE.
• bne: FDEϕ.
The additions of b, n, and e, to ∅ have distinct eﬀects. The addition of b (but
not e or n) invalidates Explosion, p ∧ ¬p ` q. The addition of e (but not b
or n) invalidates ∨-introduction, p ` p∨ q. The introduction of n invalidates
Excluded Middle p ` q∨¬q, but so does the addition of e. The addition of n
(but not b or e) invalidates a disjoined form of Excluded Middle, p∨q ` q∨¬q.
(One cannot make the premise designated by assigning p or q the value e.
But assigning p the value t, and q the value n gives a countermodel.)
A ﬁrst glance at the plurivalent versions of the above semantics reveals
the following. Any plurivalent semantics which contains the values t and f
(not just one in the FDE family) and on which negation works in the usual
way, determines a paraconsistent consequence relation. For consider a B such
6See Priest (2008a), ch. 7. For B3, see Haack (1996), pp. 169-70.
7Many thanks to Thomas Ferguson for drawing my attention to this.
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7that B [p] = {t, f} and B [q] = {f}. This shows that p,¬p 2Mp q. Hence
if M is any semantics in the FDE family having an explosive consequence
relation, its corresponding plurivalent semantics is going to deliver a strictly
weaker consequence relation, and so is not conservative. In particular, the
plurivalent consequence relation corresponding to ∅ is known to be that given
by the semantics b.8 By contrast, the plurivalent semantics given by b, bn,
and bne are known to be conservative over the univalent semantics.9 Why
is going plurivalent sometimes conservative and sometimes not? In the next
section I determine the consequence relations for the plurivalent semantics
corresponding to each univalent semantics in the FDE family, in the process
answering this question.
5 Plurivalence and the FDE Family
Let M be any many-valued semantics in the FDE family, and let M b be
the semantics obtained by adding b to its values, if necessary. We can deﬁne
a map from the values of M˙ to the values of M b, and show that this is a
homomorphism onto M b. The deﬁnition is by cases:
• if b ∈ X then θ(X) = b
• else:
 if t ∈ X and f ∈ X then θ(X) = b
 if t ∈ X and f /∈ X then θ(X) = t
 if t /∈ X and f ∈ X then θ(X) = f
• else: if n ∈ X then θ(X) = n
• else: θ(X) = e
Note that this deﬁnition makes sense for any semantics in our family.
θ is onto: θ({t}) = t, θ({f}) = f , θ({t, f}) = b, and if n or e is a value in
M b, θ({n}) = n, and θ({e}) = e. It is also clear that θ preserves designated
values. In all our logics, A ∨ B can be deﬁned as ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B). Hence to
check that θ is a homomorphism, we need only check the cases for the truth
functions for ¬ and ∧.
8See Priest (1984).
9For b this is proved by a model theoretic construction in Priest (1984). I generalise
this in the next section. For bn and bne, the results are proved in Priest (2010) and (2012),
respectively, by considering proof theories for these logics.
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8For ¬, we need to show that θ(δ¬(X)) = δ¬(θ(X)). We check this by
cases. If b ∈ X then δ¬(θ(X)) = δ¬(b) = b. And θ(δ¬(X)) = θ(Y ), where
b ∈ Y . So θ(δ¬(X)) = b. The other cases are similar, and left as exercises.
For ∧, we need to show that θ(δ∧(X, Y )) = δ∧(θ(X), θ(Y )). There are
36 cases to check, though since conjunction is commutative, this reduces the
number to 21. Here are the ﬁrst 6 cases. Suppose that b ∈ X:
1. b ∈ Y . Then b ∈ δ∧(X, Y ), so θ(δ∧(X, Y )) = b. And δ∧(θ(X), θ(Y )) =
δ∧(b, b) = b.
2. b /∈ Y , t ∈ Y , f ∈ Y . Then b ∈ δ∧(X, Y ), so θ(δ∧(X, Y )) = b. And
δ∧(θ(X), θ(Y )) = δ∧(b, b) = b.
3. b /∈ Y , t ∈ Y , f /∈ Y . Then b ∈ δ∧(X, Y ), so θ(δ∧(X, Y )) = b. And
δ∧(θ(X), θ(Y )) = δ∧(b, b) = b.
4. b /∈ Y , t /∈ Y , f ∈ Y . Then f ∈ δ∧(X, Y ), but b /∈ δ∧(X, Y ) and
t /∈ δ∧(X, Y ), so θ(δ∧(X, Y )) = f . And δ∧(θ(X), θ(Y )) = δ∧(b, f) = f .
5. b /∈ Y , t /∈ Y , f /∈ Y , n ∈ Y . Then f ∈ δ∧(X, Y ), but b /∈ δ∧(X, Y ) and
t /∈ δ∧(X, Y ), so θ(δ∧(X, Y )) = f . And δ∧(θ(X), θ(Y )) = δ∧(b, n) = f .
6. b /∈ Y , t /∈ Y , f /∈ Y , n /∈ Y . Then δ∧(X, Y ) = δ∧({e}, {e}) = e, so
θ(δ∧(X, Y )) = e. And δ∧(θ(X), θ(Y )) = δ∧(e, e) = e.
The other cases are left as exercises.
The existence of the homomorphism delivers us a complete characterisa-
tion of the plurivalent consequence relations in our family. For if M is any
one of our semantics, then by (3) and (4), we have:
(6) Σ |=Mp A⇔ Σ |=M˙u A⇔ Σ |=Mbu A
The plurivalent consequence relation for M is just the consequence relation
for the univalent semantics obtained by adding the value b. As a corollary, if
the semantics contains b already, plurivalence is conservative. And if it does
not, plurivalence is not conservative, since it turns an explosive consequence
relation into a paraconsistent one.
6 General Plurivalence
In this section we will consider what happens when one drops the Positivity
Condition. In plurivalent logics of this kind, a relation may relate a propo-
sitional parameter (and hence an arbitrary formula) to any number of truth
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9values, including zero. I will call this kind of plurivalence general plurivalence.
What I have so far called plurivalence I will now call positive plurivalence.
It is clear that, given a univalent semantics, the consequence relation de-
livered by its corresponding general plurivalent semantics can be no stronger
than that delivered by its corresponding positive plurivalent semantics. For
any positive plurivalent evaluation is a general plurivalent evaluation. Hence,
if we subscript the general plurivalent consequence relation with a g, we have:
(7) Σ |=Mg A⇒ Σ |=Mp A⇒ Σ |=Mu A
The general plurivalent semantics may or may not be conservative over the
univalent one, and indeed, over the positive plurivalent sematics, as we will
see in a moment.
Given a positive plurivalent semantics based on the structure M , we saw
how to construct an equivalent univalent semantics, M˙ . Applying the same
construction to the general plurivalent semantics based on M produces a
corresponding univalent semantics, in exactly the same way. We may write
this as M¨ . The only diﬀerence between M˙ and M¨ is that the empty set
is a value of the latter, but not of the former. (Hence, if M is an n-valued
semantics M¨ is a 2n-valued semantics.) Exactly the same argument as before
shows that:
(8) Σ |=Mg A⇔ Σ |=M¨u A
Now, take any univalent semantics, M (not just one in the FDE family)
and augment it, if necessary, with a non-designated value e, such that an e
input always gives an e output, and non-e inputs always give a non-e output.
Call the resultM e. Then the consequence relation for the positive plurivalent
semantics for M e is the same as that for the general plurivalent semantics
for M . That is:
(9) Σ |=Mep A⇔ Σ |=Mg A
For the proof from left to right, suppose that Σ 2Mg A. Let B be an evaluation
which delivers a counter-model. Consider the evaluation, Be which is the
same, except that whereB [p] = ∅, Be [p] = {e}. This is a positive plurivalent
evaluation for M e. Moreover, it is not diﬃcult to see that for any formula,
A:
• if B [A] = ∅ then Be [A] = {e}
• otherwise, B [A] =Be [A]
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The proof is by recursion on the formation of A. The details are straightfor-
ward. It follows that Σ 2Mep A.
For the proof from left to right, suppose that Σ 2Mep A. Let Be be
an evaluation which delivers a counter-model. Consider the evaluation, B,
which is the same as Be, except that it does not relate anything to e. This
is a general plurivalent evaluation for M . Moreover, it is not diﬃcult to see
that for any value, v, distinct from e, and for any A:
• A Be v iﬀ A B v
The proof is by recursion on the formation of A. The details are again
straightforward. It follows that Σ 2Mg A.
We see, then, that to obtain the general plurivalient consequence relation
for a univalent semantics one just adds e to its values, and then takes the
positive plurivalent consquence relation. In particular, if the semantics al-
ready contains the value e, positive and general plurivalentization produce
the same consequence relation.
Thus, for logics in the FDE family, if the univalent semantics contains
b and e, the general plurivalent semantics is conservative over it. Otherwise
not. If the univalent semantics does not contain b, the consequence relation is
explosive; the consequence relation for the general plurivalent logic is para-
consistent. If the univalent semantics does not contain e, its consequence
validates ∨-introduction, which is invalid when e is present.10
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have seen that given any univalent semantics, we may pro-
duce the semantics which are positively and generally plurivalent with respect
to it. For any univalent semantics, M , in the FDE family, the consequence
relation for the corresponding positive plurivalent logic is the same as that
delivered by the univalent semantics obtained by adding b to the values ofM
(if it is not already there); and the consequence relation delivered by corre-
sponding general plurivalent semantics is the same as that for the univalent
10It is worth noting that Shramko and Wansing (2011), chs. 3 and 4, show how, given
any univalent logic M , to construct a logic whose values are the values of M¨ . Given their
approach, it is natural to think of the empty set not simply as an absence of values, but as
a positive value in its own right. This motivates diﬀerent possible deﬁnitions for the truth
functions in the logic, producing somewhat diﬀerent results. In particular, with these
deﬁnitions, the empty set does not generate a failure of ∨-introduction. In this context, it
is worth noting that applying plurivalence to classical logic does not produce FDE.
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semantics obtained by adding b and e to the values of M (if they are not
already there).
Of course, there are many more important things to be investigated.
For a start, there should be a detailed investigation of the application of
the plurivalent technique to logics other than the FDE family, such as, for
example, continuum-valued logics. What are the logics generated in this
way, and under what general conditions is plurivalence conservative over a
univalent logic?
Moreover, the technique can be generalised. As we have seen, given any
univalent semantics, M , going plurivalent produces an equivalent univalent
logic with more values (identifying any value v with {v} under this homomor-
phism)in fact two, M˙ and M¨ . We can apply the construction to these, and
then, if we wish, repeat the process. We can even collect up the values, and
consider the limit.11 In the case of logics in the FDE family, this produces
no further change in consequence relation, since after the ﬁrst application,
plurivalence is conservative, as we have seen.12
Moreover, as should be clear, the technique of plurivalence can be applied
beyond the realm of propositional many-valued logics. We can apply it to
any logic with a univalent world-semantics, by applying it to the truth values
available at each world. We can apply it to any ﬁrst-order logic with a uni-
valent semantics. Also, we can apply it not only to truth but to denotation.
In standard semantics, denotation is a function from constants into the do-
main. This can be replaced by a relation, allowing for multiple denotations.13
I leave these matters for future investigation.14
8 Appendix
This appendix concerns a variation of the deﬁnition of designation for pluri-
valent logics. Speciﬁcally, we replace the deﬁnition of designation of Section
2 by: `B designates A' as: for all v such that A B v, v ∈ D. This changes
nothing till Section 5, except the deﬁnition of the designated values in M˙ ,
where the modiﬁcation required is obvious. For Section 5, let Mn be the se-
mantics obtained from M by adding the value n, if necessary. Then line (6)
11This is done for classical logic and positive plurivalence in Priest (1984).
12For the limit: anything valid in the limit logic is valid in each ﬁnite approximation.
Conversely, anything invalid in it is invalid in some approximation, since only ﬁnitely many
values are employed in the counter-model.
13The construction is used, in eﬀect, in Priest (1995), and (2005), ch. 8.
14Many thanks go to Lloyd Humberstone for very helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this paper. Thanks, too, go to an anonymous referee for this journal.
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holds provided we replaceM b withMn. The homomorphism that establishes
this is deﬁned as follows:
• if if e ∈ X then θ(X) = e
• else: if n ∈ X then θ(X) = n
• else: if t ∈ X and f ∈ X then θ(X) = n
• else:
 if X = {t, b} then θ(X) = t
 if X = {t, f} then θ(X) = f
 if X = {x} then θ(X) = x
One may check that this is a homomorphism, and that it is onto.
Things are quite diﬀerent with respect to the general plurivalence of Sec-
tion 6, however; and matters do not modify in such a straightforward way.
In particular, the alignment between |=Mep and |=Mg disappears in both di-
rections. Thus, for M take classical logic (∅). Then, as one may check,
p ∧ q |=ep p, p ∧ q 2∅g p (let B relate q to just f , and p to nothing); and
p 2ep p∨ q, but p |=∅g p∨ q (for a counter-model, p must relate to just t; all the
values of p∨ q are then designatedeven when q relates to nothing!). What
one can say to characterise general plurivalence in this case is still an open
question.
References
[1] Czelakowski, J. (2001), Protoalgebraic Logics, Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers.
[2] Haack, S. (1996), Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism,
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
[3] Oller, C. (1999), `Paraconsistency and Analyticity', Logic and Logical
Philosophy 7: 91-9.
[4] Priest, G. (1984), `Hypercontradictions', Logique et Analyse 107: 237-
43.
[5] Priest, G. (1995), `Multiple Denotation, Ambiguity, and the Strange
Case of the Missing Amoeba', Logique et Analyse 38: 361-73.
Australasian Journal of Logic (11) 2014, Article no. 1
13
[6] Priest, G. (2005), Towards Non-Being, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[7] Priest, G. (2008a), Introduction to Non-Classical Logics: From If to Is,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[8] Priest, G. (2008b), `Jaina Logic: a Contemporary Perspective', History
and Philosophy of Logic 29: 263-278.
[9] Priest, G. (2010), `The Logic of the Catus.kot.i', Comparative Philosophy
1: 32-54.
[10] Priest, G. (2012), `None of the Above: the Logic of the Catus.kot.i',
a paper given at the conference Studies on Indian and Islamic Logic,
Istanbul University, April 2012.
[11] Priest, G. (2014), `Speaking of the Ineﬀable', to appear in Liu, J-L. and
Berger, D. (eds.), Nothingness in Asian Philosophy, London: Routledge
[12] Shramko, Y., and Wansing, H. (2011), Truth and Falsity: an Inquiry
into Generalized Truth Values, Dordrecht: Springer.
Australasian Journal of Logic (11) 2014, Article no. 1
